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Abstract
When applying machine learning to sensitive data, one has to find a balance between accu-
racy, information security, and computational-complexity. Recent studies combined Homomor-
phic Encryption with neural networks to make inferences while protecting against information
leakage. However, these methods are limited by the width and depth of neural networks that can
be used (and hence the accuracy) and exhibit high latency even for relatively simple networks.
In this study we provide two solutions that address these limitations. In the first solution, we
present more than 10× improvement in latency and enable inference on wider networks com-
pared to prior attempts with the same level of security. The improved performance is achieved
by novel methods to represent the data during the computation. In the second solution, we apply
the method of transfer learning to provide private inference services using deep networks with
latency of ∼ 0.16 seconds. We demonstrate the efficacy of our methods on several computer
vision tasks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is used in several domains such as education, health, and finance in which data
may be private or confidential. Therefore, machine learning algorithms should preserve privacy
while making accurate predictions. The privacy requirement pertains to all sub-tasks of the learning
process, such as training and inference. For the purpose of this study, we focus on private neural-
networks inference. In this problem, popularized by the work on CryptoNets (Dowlin et al., 2016),
the goal is to build an inference service that can make predictions on private data. To achieve this
goal, the data is encrypted before it is sent to the prediction service, which should be capable of
operating on the encrypted data without having access to the raw data. Several cryptology tech-
nologies have been proposed for this task, including Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) (Yao,
1982; Goldreich et al., 1987), hardware enclaves, such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
(McKeen et al., 2013), Homomorphic Encryption (HE) (Gentry, 2009), and combinations of these
techniques.
The different approaches present different trade-offs in terms of computation, accuracy, and
security. HE presents the most stringent security model. The security assumption relies on the
hardness of solving a mathematical problem for which there are no known efficient algorithms, even
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by quantum computers (Gentry, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2018). Other techniques, such as MPC and
SGX make additional assumptions and therefore provide weaker protection to the data (Yao, 1982;
McKeen et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2018; Koruyeh et al., 2018).
While HE provides the highest level of security it is also limited in the kind of operations it allows
and the complexity of these operations (see Section 3.1). CryptoNets (Dowlin et al., 2016) was
the first demonstration of a privacy preserving Encrypted Prediction as a Service (EPaaS) solution
(Sanyal et al., 2018) based on HE. CryptoNets are capable of making predictions with accuracy of
99% on the MNIST task (LeCun et al., 2010) with a throughput of ∼ 59000 predictions per hour.
However, CryptoNets have several limitations. The first is latency - it takes CryptoNets 205 seconds
to process a single prediction request. The second is the width of the network that can be used for
inference. The encoding scheme used by CryptoNets, which encodes each node in the network as
a separate message, can create a memory bottleneck when applied to networks with many nodes.
For example, CryptoNets’ approach requires 100’s of Gigabytes of RAM to evaluate a standard
convolutional network on CIFAR-10. The third limitation is the depth of the network that can be
evaluated. Each layer in the network adds more sequential multiplication operations which result
in increased noise levels and message size growth (see Section 5). This makes private inference on
deep networks, such as AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), infeasible with CryptoNets’ approach.
In this study, we present two solutions that address these limitations. The first solution is Low-
Latency CryptoNets (LoLa), which can evaluate the same neural network used by CryptoNets in as
little as 2.2 seconds. Most of the speedup (11.2× ) comes from novel ways to represent the data
when applying neural-networks using HE.1 In a nut-shell, CryptoNets represent each node in the
neural network as a separate message for encryption, while LoLa encrypts entire layers and changes
representations of the data throughout the computation. This speedup is achieved while maintaining
the same accuracy in predictions and 128 bits of security (Albrecht et al., 2018).2
LoLa provides another significant benefit over CryptoNets. It substantially reduces the amount
of memory required to process the encrypted messages and allows for inferences on wider networks.
We demonstrate that in an experiment conducted on the CIFAR-10 dataset, for which CryptoNets’
approach fails to execute since it requires 100’s of Gigabytes of RAM. In contrast, LoLa, can make
predictions in 12 minutes using only a few Gigabytes of RAM.
The experiment on CIFAR demonstrates that LoLa can handle larger networks than CryptoNets.
However, the performance still degrades considerably when applied to deeper networks. To handle
such networks we propose another solution which is based on transfer learning. In this approach,
data is first processed to form “deep features” that have higher semantic meaning. These deep
features are encrypted and sent to the service provider for private evaluation. We discuss the pros
and cons of this approach in Section 5 and show that it can make private predictions on the CalTech-
101 dataset in 0.16 seconds using a model that has class balanced accuracy of 81.6%. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to propose using transfer learning in private neural network inference
with HE. Our code is freely available at https://github.com/microsoft/CryptoNets.
2 Related Work
The task of private predictions has gained increasing attention in recent years. Dowlin et al. (2016)
presented CryptoNets which demonstrated the feasibility of private neural networks predictions us-
ing HE. CryptoNets are capable of making predictions with high throughput but are limited in both
1The rest of the speedup (8.2×) is due to the use of a faster implementation of HE.
2The HE scheme used by CryptoNets was found to have some weaknesses that are not present in the HE scheme used
here.
2
the size of the network they can support and the latency per prediction. Bourse et al. (2017) used a
different HE scheme that allows fast bootstrapping which results in only linear penalty for additional
layers in the network. However, it is slower per operation and therefore, the results they presented
are significantly less accurate (see Table 2). Boemer et al. (2018) proposed an HE based extension
to the Intel nGraph compiler. They use similar techniques to CryptoNets (Dowlin et al., 2016) with
a different underlying encryption scheme, HEAAN (Cheon et al., 2017). Their solution is slower
than ours in terms of latency (see Table 2). In another recent work, Badawi et al. (2018) obtained a
40.41× acceleration over CryptoNets by using GPUs. In terms of latency, our solution is more than
6× faster than their solution even though it uses only the CPU. Sanyal et al. (2018) argued that many
of these methods leak information about the structure of the neural-network that the service provider
uses through the parameters of the encryption. They presented a method that leaks less information
about the neural-network but their solution is considerably slower. Nevertheless, their solution has
the nice benefit that it allows the service provider to change the network without requiring changes
on the client side.
In parallel to our work, Chou et al. (2018) introduce alternative methods to reduce latency.
Their solution on MNIST runs in 39.1s (98.7% accuracy), whereas our LoLa runs in 2.2s (98.95%
accuracy). On CIFAR, their inference takes more than 6 hours (76.7% accuracy), and ours takes less
than 12 minutes (74.1% accuracy). Makri et al. (2019) apply transfer learning to private inference.
However, their methods and threat model are different.
Other researchers proposed using different encryption schemes. For example, the Chameleon
system (Riazi et al., 2018) uses MPC to demonstrate private predictions on MNIST and Juvekar
et al. (2018) used a hybrid MPC-HE approach for the same task. Several hardware based solutions,
such as the one of Tramer & Boneh (2018) were proposed. These approaches are faster however,
this comes at the cost of lower level of security.
3 Background
In this section we provide a concise background on Homomorphic Encryption and CryptoNets. We
refer the reader to Dowlin et al. (2017) and Dowlin et al. (2016) for a detailed exposition. We use
bold letters to denote vectors and for any vector u we denote by ui its ith coordinate.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
In this study, we use Homomorphic Encryptions (HE) to provide privacy. HE are encryptions that
allow operations on encrypted data without requiring access to the secret key (Gentry, 2009). The
data used for encryption is assumed to be elements in a ring R. On top of the encryption function
E and the decryption function D, the HE scheme provides two additional operators ⊕ and ⊗ so that
for any x1, x2 ∈ R
D (E(x1)⊕E (x2)) = x1 + x2 and
D (E (x1)⊗ E (x2)) = x1 × x2
where + and × are the standard addition and multiplication operations in the ringR. Therefore, the
⊕ and ⊗ operators allow computing addition and multiplication on the data in its encrypted form
and thus computing any polynomial function. We note that the ringR refers to the plaintext message
ring and not the encrypted message ring. In the rest of the paper we refer to the former ring and note
that by the homomorphic properties, any operation on an encrypted message translates to the same
operation on the corresponding plaintext message.
3
Much progress has been made since Gentry (2009) introduced the first HE scheme. We use the
Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren scheme3 (BFV) (Fan & Vercauteren, 2012; Brakerski & Vaikuntanathan,
2014) In this scheme, the ring on which the HE operates is R = Zp[x]xn+1 where Zp = ZpZ , and n is
a power of 2.4 If the parameters p and n are chosen so that there is an order 2n root of unity in
Zp, then every element in R can be viewed as a vector of dimension n of elements in Zp where
addition and multiplication operate component-wise (Brakerski et al., 2014). Therefore, throughout
this essay we will refer to the messages as n dimensional vectors in Zp. The BFV scheme allows
another operation on the encrypted data: rotation. The rotation operation is a slight modification to
the standard rotation operation of size k that sends the value in the i’th coordinate of a vector to the
((i+ k) mod n) coordinate.
To present the rotation operations it is easier to think of the message as a 2× n/2 matrix:[
m1 m2 · · mn/2
mn/2+1 mn/2+2 · · mn
]
with this view in mind, there are two rotations allowed, one switches the row, which will turn the
above matrix to [
mn/2+1 mn/2+2 · · mn
m1 m2 · · mn/2
]
and the other rotates the columns. For example, rotating the original matrix by one column to the
right will result in [
mn/2 m1 · · mn/2−1
mn mn/2+1 · · mn−1
]
.
Since n is a power of two, and the rotations we are interested in are powers of two as well,
thinking about the rotations as standard rotations of the elements in the message yields similar
results for our purposes. In this view, the row-rotation is a rotation of size n/2 and smaller rotations
are achieved by column rotations.
3.2 CryptoNets
Dowlin et al. (2016) introduced CryptoNets, a method that performs private predictions on neural
networks using HE. Since HE does not support non-linear operations such as ReLU or sigmoid, they
replaced these operations by square activations. Using a convolutional network with 4 hidden layers,
they demonstrated that CryptoNets can make predictions with an accuracy of 99% on the MNIST
task. They presented latency of 205 seconds for a single prediction and throughput of ∼ 59000
predictions per hour.
The high throughput is due to the vector structure of encrypted messages used by CryptoNets,
which allows processing multiple records simultaneously. CryptoNets use a message for every input
feature. However, since each message can encode a vector of dimension n, then n input records
are encoded simultaneously such that vij , which is the value of the j’th feature in the i’th record is
mapped to the i’th coordinate of the j’th message. In CryptoNets all operations between vectors and
matrices are implemented using additions and multiplications only (no rotations). For example, a
dot product between two vectors of length k is implemented by k multiplications and additions.
CryptoNets have several limitations. First, the fact that each feature is represented as a message,
results in a large number of operations for a single prediction and therefore high latency. The large
3We use version 2.3.1 of the SEAL, http://sealcrypto.org/, with parameters that guarantee 128 bits of security
according to the proposed standard for Homomorphic Encryptions (Albrecht et al., 2018).
4See supplementary material for a brief introduction to rings used in this work.
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number of messages also results in high memory usage and creates memory bottlenecks as we
demonstrate in Section 4.4. Furthermore, CryptoNets cannot be applied to deep networks such
as AlexNet. This is because the multiplication operation in each layer increases the noise in the
encrypted message and the required size of each message, which makes each operation significantly
slower when many layers exist in the network (see Section 5 for further details).
4 LoLa
In this section we present the Low-Latency CryptoNets (LoLa) solution for private inference. LoLa
uses various representations of the encrypted messages and alternates between them during the com-
putation. This results in better latency and memory usage than CryptoNets, which uses a single
representation where each pixel (feature) is encoded as a separate message.
In Section 4.1, we show a simple example of a linear classifier, where a change of representation
can substantially reduce latency and memory usage. In Section 4.2, we present different types of
representations and how various matrix-vector multiplication implementations can transform one
type of representation to another. In Section 4.3, we apply LoLa in a private inference task on
MNIST and show that it can perform a single prediction in 2.2 seconds. In Section 4.4, we apply
LoLa to perform private inference on the CIFAR-10 dataset.
4.1 Linear Classifier Example
In this section we provide a simple example of a linear classifier that illustrates the limitations of
CryptoNets that are due to its representation. We show that a simple change of the input repre-
sentation results in much faster inference and significantly lower memory usage. This change of
representation technique is at the heart of the LoLa solution and in the next sections we show how
to extend it to non-linear neural networks with convolutions.
Assume that we have a single d dimensional input vector v (e.g., a single MNIST image) and
we would like to apply a private prediction of a linear classifier w on v. Using the CryptoNets
representation, we would need d messages for each entry of v and d multiplication and addition
operations to perform the dot product w · v.
Consider the following alternative representation: encode the input vector v as a single message
m where for all i, mi = vi. We can implement a dot product between two vectors, whose sizes are
a power of 2, by applying point-wise multiplication between the two vectors and a series of log d
rotations of size 1, 2, 4, . . . , d/2 and addition between each rotation. The result of such a dot product
is a vector that holds the results of the dot-product in all its coordinates.5 Thus, in total the operation
requires log d rotations and additions and a single multiplication, and uses only a single message.
This results in a significant reduction in latency and memory usage compared to the CryptoNets
approach which requires d operations and d messages.
4.2 Message Representations
In the previous section we saw an example of a linear classifier with two different representations of
the encrypted data and how they affect the number of HE operations and memory usage. To extend
5Consider calculating the dot product of the vectors (v1, ..., v4) and (w1, ..., w4) . Point-wise multiplication, rotation
of size 1 and summation results in the vector (v1w1 + v4w4, v2w2 + v1w1, v3w3 + v2w2, v4w4 + v3w3). Another
rotation of size 2 and summation results in the 4 dimensional vector which contains the dot-product of the vectors in all
coordinates.
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these observations to generic feed-forward neural networks, we define other forms of representa-
tions which are used by LoLa. Furthermore, we define different implementations of matrix-vector
multiplications and show how they change representations during the forward pass of the network.
As an example of this change of representation, consider a matrix-vector multiplication, where the
input vector is represented as a single message (mi = vi as in the previous section). We can multiply
the matrix by the vector using r dot-product operations, where the dot-product is implemented as
in the previous section, and r is the number of rows in the matrix. The result of this operation is a
vector of length r that is spread across r messages (recall that the result of the dot-product operation
is a vector which contains the dot-product result in all of its coordinates). Therefore, the result has a
different representation than the representation of the input vector.
Different representations can induce different computational costs and therefore the choice of
the representations used throughout the computation is important for obtaining an efficient solution.
In the LoLa solution, we propose using different representations for different layers of the network.
In this study we present implementations for several neural networks to demonstrate the gains of
using varying representations. Automating the process of finding efficient representations for a
given network is beyond the scope of the current work.
We present different possible vector representations in Section 4.2.1 and discuss matrix-vector
multiplication implementations in Section 4.2.2. We note that several representations are new (e.g.,
convolutional and interleaved), whereas SIMD and dense representations were used before.
4.2.1 Vector representations Recall that a message encodes a vector of length n of elements in
Zp. For the sake of brevity, we assume that the dimension of the vector v to be encoded is of length k
such that k ≤ n, for otherwise multiple messages can be combined. We will consider the following
representations:
Dense representation. A vector v is represented as a single message m by setting vi 7→ mi.
Sparse representation. A vector v of length k is represented in k messages m1, . . .mk such that
mi is a vector in which every coordinate is set to vi.6
Stacked representation. For a short (low dimension) vector v, the stacked representation holds
several copies of the vector v in a single message m. Typically this will be done by finding d =
dlog (k)e, the smallest d such that the dimension of v is at most 2d and settingmi,mi+2d ,mi+2·2d , . . . =
vi.
Interleaved representation. The interleaved representation uses a permutation σ of [1, . . . , n] to
set mσ(i) = vi. The dense representation is a special case of the interleaved representation where σ
is the identity permutation.
Convolution representation. This is a special representation that makes convolution operations
efficient. A convolution, when flattened to a single dimension, can be viewed as a restricted linear
operation where there is a weight vector w of length r (the window size) and a set of permutations σi
6Recall that the messages are in the ring R = Zp[x]
xn+1
which, by the choice of parameters, is homomorphic to (Zp)n.
When a vector has the same value vi in all its coordinates, then its polynomial representation in
Zp[x]
xn+1
is the constant
polynomial vi.
6
such that the i’th output of the linear transformation is
∑
j wjvσi(j). The convolution representation
takes a vector v and represents it as r messages m1, . . . ,mr such that mji = vσi(j).
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SIMD representation: This is the representation used by CryptoNets (Dowlin et al., 2016). They
represent each feature as a separate message but map multiple data vectors into the same set of
messages, as described in Section 3.2.
4.2.2 Matrix-vector multiplications Matrix-vector multiplication is a core operation in neural
networks. The matrix may contain the learned weights of the network and the vector represents the
values of the nodes at a certain layer. Here we present different ways to implement such matrix-
vector operations. Each method operates on vectors in different representations and produces output
in yet another representation. Furthermore, the weight matrix has to be represented appropriately
as a set of vectors, either column-major or row-major to allow the operation. We assume that the
matrix W has k columns c1, . . . , ck and r rows r1, . . . , rr. We consider the following matrix-vector
multiplication implementations.
Dense Vector – Row Major. If the vector is given as a dense vector and each row rj of the weight
matrix is encoded as a dense vector then the matrix-vector multiplication can be applied using r
dot-product operations. As already described above, a dot-product requires a single multiplication
and log (n) additions and rotations. The result is a sparse representation of a vector of length r.
Sparse Vector – Column Major. Recall that Wv =
∑
vic
i. Therefore, when v is encoded in
a sparse format, the message mi has all its coordinate set to vi and vici can be computed using
a single point-wise multiplication. Therefore, Wv can be computed using k multiplications and
additions and the result is a dense vector.
Stacked Vector – Row Major. For the sake of clarity, assume that k = 2d for some d. In this
case n/k copies of v can be stacked in a single message m (this operation requires log (n/k) − 1
rotations and additions). By concatenating n/k rows of W into a single message, a special version
of the dot-product operation can be used to compute n/k elements of Wv at once. First, a point-
wise multiplication of the stacked vector and the concatenated rows is applied followed by d − 1
rotations and additions where the rotations are of size 1, 2, . . . , 2d−1. The result is in the interleaved
representation.8
The Stacked Vector - Row Major gets its efficiency from two places. First, the number of modi-
fied dot product operations is rk/n and second, each dot product operation requires a single multipli-
cation and only d rotations and additions (compared to log n rotations and additions in the standard
dot-product procedure).
7For example, consider a matrix A ∈ R4×4 which corresponds to an input image and a 2 × 2 convolution filter that
slides across the image with stride 2 in each direction. Let ai,j be the entry at row i and column j of the matrix A. Then,
in this case r = 4 and the following messages are formed M1 = (a1,1, a1,3, a3,1, a3,3) , M2 = (a1,2, a1,4, a3,2, a3,4),
M3 = (a2,1, a2,3, a4,1, a4,3) and M4 = (a2,2, a2,4, a4,2, a4,4). In some cases it will be more convenient to combine
the interleaved representation with the convolution representation by a permutation τ such that mj
τ(i)
= vσi(j).
8For example, consider a 2 × 2 matrix W flattened to a vector w = (w1,1, w1,2, w2,1, w2,2) and a two-dimensional
vector v = (v1, v2). Then, after stacking the vectors, point-wise multiplication, rotation of size 1 and summation, the
second entry of the result contains w1,1v1 +w1,2v2 and the fourth entry contains w2,1v1 +w2,2v2. Hence, the result is in
an interleaved representation.
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Table 1: Message size, message representation and operations in each layer of the LoLa inference
solution on MNIST. The input size format is number of vectors × dimension.
Layer Input size Representation LoLa operation
5× 5 convolution layer 25× 169 convolution convolution vector – row major multiplication
5× 169 dense combine to one vector using 4 rotations and additions
square layer 1× 845 dense square
dense layer
1× 845 dense stack vectors using 8 rotations and additions
1× 6760 stacked stacked vector – row major multiplication
13× 8 interleave combine to one vector using 12 rotations and additions
square layer 1× 100 interleave square
dense layer 1× 100 interleave interleaved vector – row major
output layer 1× 10 sparse
Interleaved Vector – Row Major. This setting is very similar to the dense vector – row major
matrix multiplication procedure with the only difference being that the columns of the matrix have
to be shuffled to match the permutation of the interleaved representation of the vector. The result is
in sparse format.
Convolution vector – Row Major. A convolution layer applies the same linear transformation
to different locations on the data vector v. For the sake of brevity, assume the transformation is
one-dimensional. In neural network language that would mean that the kernel has a single map.
Obviously, if more maps exist, then the process described here can be repeated multiple times.
Recall that a convolution, when flattened to a single dimension, is a restricted linear operation
where the weight vector w is of length r, and there exists a set of permutations σi such that the
i’th output of the linear transformation is
∑
wjvσi(j). In this case, the convolution representation
is made of r messages such that the i’th element in the message mj is vσi(j). By using a sparse
representation of the vector w, we get that
∑
wjm
j computes the set of required outputs using r
multiplications and additions. When the weights are not encrypted, the multiplications used here are
relatively cheap since the weights are scalar and BFV supports fast implementation of multiplying a
message by a scalar. The result of this operation is in a dense format.
4.3 Secure Networks for MNIST
Here we present private predictions on the MNIST data-set (LeCun et al., 2010) using the techniques
described above and compare it to other private prediction solutions for this task (see Table 2).
Recall that CryptoNets use the SIMD representation in which each pixel requires its own message.
Therefore, since each image in the MNIST data-set is made up of an array of 28×28 pixels, the input
to the CryptoNets network is made of 784 messages. On the reference machine used for this work
(Azure standard B8ms virtual machine with 8 vCPUs and 32GB of RAM), the original CryptoNets
implementation runs in 205 seconds. Re-implementing it to use better memory management and
multi-threading in SEAL 2.3 reduces the running time to 24.8 seconds. We refer to the latter version
as CryptoNets 2.3.
LoLa and CryptoNets use different approaches to evaluating neural networks. As a benchmark,
we applied both to the same network that has accuracy of 98.95%. After suppressing adjacent
linear layers it can be presented as a 5 × 5 convolution layer with a stride of (2, 2) and 5 output
maps, which is followed by a square activation function that feeds a fully connected layer with 100
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Table 2: MNIST performance comparison. Solutions are grouped by accuracy levels.
Method Accuracy Latency
FHE–DiNN100 96.35% 1.65 (Bourse et al., 2017)
LoLa-Small 96.92% 0.29
CryptoNets 98.95% 205 (Dowlin et al., 2016)
nGraph-HE 98.95%9 135 (Boemer et al., 2018)
Faster-CryptoNets 98.7% 39.1 (Chou et al., 2018)
CryptoNets 2.3 98.95 24.8
HCNN 99% 14.1 (Badawi et al., 2018)
LoLa-Dense 98.95% 7.2
LoLa 98.95% 2.2
output neurons, another square activation and another fully connected layer with 10 outputs (in the
supplementary material we include an image of the architecture).
LoLa uses different representations and matrix-vector multiplication implementations through-
out the computation. Table 1 summarizes the message representations and operations that LoLa
applies in each layer. The inputs to LoLa are 25 messages which are the convolution representation
of the image. Then, LoLa performs a convolution vector – row major multiplication for each of the
5 maps of the convolution layer which results in 5 dense output messages. These 5 dense output
messages are joined together to form a single dense vector of 5 ∗ 169 = 845 elements. This vector
is squared using a single multiplication and 8 copies of the results are stacked before applying the
dense layer. Then 13 rounds of Stacked vector – Row Major multiplication are performed. The 13
vectors of interleaved results are rotated and added to form a single interleaved vector of dimension
100. The vector is then squared using a single multiplication. Finally, Interleaved vector – Row
Major multiplication is used to obtain the final result in sparse format.
LoLa computes the entire network in only 2.2 seconds which is 11× faster than CryptoNets 2.3
and 93× faster than CryptoNets. Table 2 shows a summary of the performance of different meth-
ods. In the supplementary material we show the dependence of the performance on the number of
processor cores. We provide two additional versions of LoLa. The first, LoLa-Dense, uses a dense
representation as input and then transforms it to a convolutional representation using HE operations.
Then it proceeds similarly to LoLa in subsequent layers. It performs a single prediction in 7.2 sec-
onds. We provide more details on this solution in the supplementary material. The second version,
LoLa-Small is similar to Lola-Conv but has only a convolution layer, square activation and a dense
layer. This solution has an accuracy of only 96.92% but can make a prediction in as little as 0.29
seconds.
4.4 Secure Networks for CIFAR
The Cifar-10 data-set (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) presents a more challenging task of recognizing
one of 10 different types of objects in an image of size 3 × 32 × 32 . For this task we train a
9The accuracy is not reported in Boemer et al. (2018). However, they implement the same network as in Dowlin et al.
(2016).
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Figure 1: The structure of the network used for CIFAR classification.
convolutional neural network that is depicted in Figure 4. The exact details of the architecture
are given in the supplementary material. For inference, adjacent linear layers were collapsed to
form a network with the following structure: (i) 8 × 8 × 3 convolutions with a stride of (2, 2) and
83 maps (ii) square activation (iii) 6 × 6 × 83 convolution with stride (2, 2) and 163 maps (iv)
square activation (v) dense layer with 10 output maps. The accuracy of this network is 74.1%. This
network is much larger than the network used for MNIST by CryptoNets. The input to this network
has 3072 nodes, the first hidden layer has 16268 nodes and the second hidden layer has 4075 nodes
(compared to 784, 845, and 100 nodes respectively for MNIST). Due to the sizes of the hidden
layers, implementing this network with the CryptoNet approach of using the SIMD representation
requires 100’s GB of RAM since a message has to be memorized for every node. Therefore, this
approach is infeasible on most computers.
For this task we take a similar approach to the one presented in Section 4.3. The image is
encoded using the convolution representation into 3×8×8 = 192 messages. The convolution layer
is implemented using the convolution vector – row major matrix-vector multiplication technique.
The results are combined into a single message using rotations and additions which allows the square
activation to be performed with a single point-wise multiplication. The second convolution layer is
performed using row major-dense vector multiplication. Although this layer is a convolution layer,
each window of the convolution is so large that it is more efficient to implement it as a dense layer.
The output is a sparse vector which is converted into a dense vector by point-wise multiplications
and additions which allows the second square activation to be performed with a single point-wise
multiplication. The last dense layer is implemented with a row major-dense vector technique again
resulting in a sparse output.
LoLa uses plain-text modulus p = 2148728833 × 2148794369 × 2149810177 (the factors are
combined using the Chinese Reminder Theorem) and n = 16384. During the computation, LoLa
uses 12 GB of RAM for a single prediction. It performs a single prediction in 730 seconds out of
which the second layer consumes 711 seconds. The bottleneck in performance is due to the sizes of
the weight matrices and data vectors as evident by the number of parameters which is > 500, 000,
compared to < 90, 000 in the MNIST network.
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5 Private Inference using Deep Representations
Homomorphic Encryptions have two main limitations when used for evaluating deep networks:
noise growth and message size growth. Every encrypted message contains some noise and every
operation on encrypted message increases the noise level. When the noise becomes too large, it
is no longer possible to decrypt the message correctly. The mechanism of bootstrapping (Gentry,
2009) can mitigate this problem but at a cost of a performance hit. The message size grows with
the size of the network as well. Since, in its core, the HE scheme operates in Zp, the parameter p
has to be selected such that the largest number obtained during computation would be smaller than
p. Since every multiplication might double the required size of p, it has to grow exponentially with
respect to the number of layers in the network. The recently introduced HEAAN scheme (Cheon
et al., 2017) is more tolerant towards message growth but even HEAAN would not be able to operate
efficiently on deep networks.
We propose solving both the message size growth and the noise growth problems using deep
representations: Instead of encrypting the data in its raw format, it is first converted, by a standard
network, to create a deep representation. For example, if the data is an image, then instead of
encrypting the image as an array of pixels, a network, such as AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012),
VGG (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), or ResNet (He et al., 2016), first extracts a deep representation
of the image, using one of its last layers. The resulting representation is encrypted and sent for
evaluation. This approach has several advantages. First, this representation is small even if the
original image is large. In addition, with deep representations it is possible to obtain high accuracies
using shallow networks: in most cases a linear predictor is sufficient which translates to a fast
evaluation with HE. It is also a very natural thing to do since in many cases of interest, such as in
medical image, training a very deep network from scratch is almost impossible since data is scarce.
Hence, it is a common practice to use deep representations and train only the top layer(s) (Yosinski
et al., 2014; Tajbakhsh et al., 2016).
To test the deep representation approach we used AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012) to generate
features and trained a linear model to make predictions on the CalTech-101 data-set (Fei-Fei et al.,
2006).10 In the supplementary material we provide a summary of the data representations used for
the CalTech-101 dataset. Since the CalTech-101 dataset is not class balanced, we used only the first
30 images from each class where the first 20 where used for training and the other 10 examples
where used for testing. The obtained model has class-balanced accuracy of 81.6%. The inference
time, on the encrypted data, takes only 0.16 seconds when using the dense vector – row major
multiplication. We note that such transfer learning approaches are common in machine learning but
to the best of our knowledge were not introduced as a solution to private predictions with He before.
The use of transfer learning for private predictions has its limitations. For example, if a power-
limited client uses private predictions to offload computation to the cloud, the transfer learning
technique would not be useful because most of the computation is on the client’s side. However,
there are important cases in which this technique is useful. For example, consider a medical institu-
tion which trains a shallow network on deep representations of private x-ray images of patients, and
would like to make its model available for private predictions. However, to protect its intellectual
property, it is not willing to share its model. In that case, it can use this technique to provide private
predictions while protecting the privacy of the model.
10More complex classifiers did not improve accuracy.
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6 Conclusions
The problem of privacy in machine learning is gaining importance due to legal requirements and
greater awareness to the benefits and risks of machine learning systems. In this study, we presented
two HE based solutions for private inference that address key limitations of previous HE based
solutions. We demonstrated both the ability to operate on more complex networks as well as lower
latency on networks that were already studied in the past.
The performance gain is mainly due to the use of multiple representations during the compu-
tation process. This may be useful in other applications of HE. One example is training machine
learning models over encrypted data. This direction is left for future study.
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A Rings
In this work we consider commutative rings R. A ring is a set which is equipped with addition and
multiplication operations and satisfies several ring axioms such as a+ b = b+ a for all a, b ∈ R. A
commutative ring is a ring in which the multiplication is commutative., i.e., ab = ba for all a, b ∈ R.
Since all rings we consider are commutative, we use the term “ring” to refer to a commutative ring.
The set Z and the set Zp of integers modulu p are rings. The elements of Zp can be thought of
as sets of the form {i + ap : a ∈ Z}. The notation k ∈ Zp refers to the set {k + ap : a ∈ Z}.
Alternatively, k is a representative of the the set {k + ap : a ∈ Z}.
The set R[x] of polynomials with coefficients in a ring R is itself a ring. Thus, Zp[x] is the
ring of polynomials with coefficients in Zp[x]. Finally, we introduce the ring Zp[x]xn+1 which is the
ring used in the BFV scheme. The elements of this ring can be thought of as sets of the form
{r(x) + q(x) (xn + 1) | q(x) ∈ Zp[x]}.
The notation t(x) ∈ Zp[x]xn+1 refers to the set {t(x) + q(x) (xn + 1) | q(x) ∈ Zp[x]}. Conversely,
we say that t(x) is a representative of the set {t(x) + q(x) (xn + 1) | q(x) ∈ Zp[x]}. For each
element in Zp[x]xn+1 , there is a representative in Zp[x] with degree at most n− 1. Furthermore, any two
non-equal polynomials of degree at most n− 1 in Zp[x], are representatives of different elements in
Zp[x]
xn+1 .
B Parallel Scaling
The performance of the different solutions is affected by the amount of parallelism allowed. The
hardware used for experimentation in this work has 8 cores. Therefore, we tested the performance
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Figure 2: Left: latency of the different network implementations for the MNIST task with respect to
the number of available cores. Right: ratio between the latency of each solution and the latency of
LoLa
of the different solutions with 1, 2, 4, and 8 cores to see how the performance varies. The results
of these experiments are presented in Figure 2. These results show that at least up to 8 cores the
performance of all methods scales linearly when tested on the MNIST data-set. This suggests that
the latency can be further improved by using machines with higher core count. We note that the
algorithm utilizes the cores well and therefore we do not expect large gains from running multiple
queries simultaneously.
C Lola-Dense
LoLa-Dense uses the same network layout as CryptoNets (see Figure 3) and has accuracy of 98.95%.
However, it is implemented differently: the input to the network is a single dense message where
the pixel values are mapped to coordinates in the encoded vector line after line . The first step
in processing this message is breaking it into 25 messages corresponding to the 25 pixels in the
convolution map to generate a convolution representation. Creating each message requires a single
vector multiplication. This is performed by creating 25 masks. The first mask is a vector of zeros
and ones that corresponds to a matrix of size 28× 28 such that a one is in the (i, j) coordinate if the
i, j pixel in the image appears as the upper left corner of the 5× 5 window of the convolution layer.
Multiplying point-wise the input vector by the mask creates the first message in the convolution
representation hybrided with the interleaved representation. Similarly the other messages in the
convolution representation are created. Note that all masks are shifts of each other which allows
using the convolution representation-row major multiplication to implement the convolution layer.
To do that, think of the 25 messages as a matrix and the weights of a map of the convolution layer as
a sparse vector. Therefore, the outputs of the entire map can be computed using 25 multiplications
(of each weight by the corresponding vector) and 24 additions. Note that there are 169 windows and
all of them are computed simultaneously. However, the process repeats 5 times for the 5 maps of the
convolution layer.
The result of the convolution layer are 5 messages, each one of them contains 169 results. They
are united into a single vector by rotating the messages such that they will not have active values
in the same locations and summing the results. At this point, a single message holds all the 845
values (169 windows ×5 maps). This vector is squared, using a single multiplication operation,
15
Figure 3: The structure of the network used for MNIST classification.
to implement the activation function that follows the convolution layer. This demonstrates one of
the main differences between CryptoNets and LoLa; In CryptoNets, the activation layer requires
845 multiplication operations, whereas in LoLa it is a single multiplication. Even if we add the
manipulation of the vector to place all values in a single message, as described above, we add only
4 rotations and 4 additions which are still much fewer operations than in CryptoNets.
Next, we apply a dense layer with 100 maps. LoLa-Dense uses messages of size n = 16384
where the 845 results of the previous layer, even though they are in interleaving representation, take
fewer than 1024 dimensions. Therefore, 16 copies are stacked together which allows the use of
the Stacked vector – Row Major multiplication method. This allows computing 16 out of the 100
maps in each operation and therefore, the entire dense layer is computed in 7 iterations resulting in 7
interleaved messages. By shifting the ith message by i−1 positions, the active outputs in each of the
messages are no longer in the same position and they are added together to form a single interleaved
message that contains the 100 outputs. The following square activation requires a single point-wise-
multiplication of this message. The final dense layer is applied using the Interleaved vector – Row
Major method to generate 10 messages, each of which contains one of the 10 outputs.11
Overall, applying the entire network takes only 7.2 seconds on the same reference hardware
which is 34.7× faster than CryptoNets and 3.4× faster than CryptoNets 2.3.
D Secure CIFAR
The neural network used has the following layout: the input is a 3× 32× 32 image (i) 3× 3 linear
convolution with stride of (1, 1) and 128 output maps, (ii) 2×2 average pooling with (2, 2) stride (iii)
3×3 convolution with (1, 1) stride and 83 maps (iv) Square activation (v) 2×2 average pooling with
(2, 2) stride (vi) 3× 3 convolution with (1, 1) stride and 163 maps (vii) Square activation (vii) 2× 2
average pooling with stride (2, 2) (viii) fully connected layer with 1024 outputs (ix) fully connected
layer with 10 outputs (x) softmax. ADAM was used for optimization Kingma & Ba (2014) together
11 It is possible, if required, to combine them into a single message in order to save communication.
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Layer Input size Representation LoLa-Dense Operation
5× 5 convolution layer
1× 784 dense mask input to create 25 messages
25× 169 convolution-interleave convolution vector – row major mult’
5× 169 interleave combine 5 messages into one
square layer 1× 845 interleave square
dense layer
1× 845 interleave stack 16 copies
1× 13520 stacked-interleave stacked vector – row major mult’
7× 16 interleave combine 7 messages into one
square layer 1× 100 interleave square
dense layer 1× 100 interleave interleaved vector – row major
output layer 10× 1 sparse
Table 3: Message size, message representation and operations in each layer of the LoLa-Dense
inference solution on MNIST. The input size format is number of vectors × dimension
Layer Input size Output format Description
Preprocess 200× 300 dense apply convolution layers from Alex-Net
Encryption 4096 dense image is encrypted into 1 message
dense layer 101 sparse dense-vector row major multiplication
Table 4: Data representation changes for CalTech 101 task
with dropouts after layers (vii) and (viii). We use zero-padding in layers (i) and (vii). See Figure 4
for an illustration of the network.
For inference, adjacent linear layers were collapsed to form the following structure: (i) 8×8×3
convolutions with a stride of (2, 2, 0) and 83 maps (ii) square activation (iii) 6× 6× 83 convolution
with stride (2, 2, 0) and 163 maps (iv) square activation (v) dense layer with 10 output maps. See
Figure 5 for an illustration.
E CalTech-101
Table 4 shows the different data representations when using the method proposed for private infer-
ence on the CalTech-101 dataset using deep representations. 12
12In Table 4 we use the terminology of dense vectors also in the first stage of applying Alex-Net before the encryption.
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Figure 4: The structure of the network used for CIFAR classification.
Figure 5: The structure of the network used for CIFAR classification after collapsing adjacent layers.
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